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Chapter 17                             
 
The Kennedy Justice Department’s  
Enforcement of Civil Rights: A View from the Trenches 
 
                                       Brian K. Landsberg 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 The Kennedy Justice Department faced challenges with no modern precedent: the 
Southern defiance of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the 
rise of non-violent protests on a massive scale, and the Administration’s desire to break a 
racial caste system that it did not fully understand.  Reconstruction provided a precedent 
for federal action, but the President was, to some extent, a captive of the myth that federal 
intervention had been a colossal failure, leading only to misrule and racial division.   
 
 Much has been written about President Kennedy’s mixed record on civil rights — 
his philosophical commitment to equality, his ambiguous votes on civil rights bills as a 
Senator, his letter regarding Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s prison term in Georgia, his 
decision not to make civil rights a priority at the beginning of his presidency, his 
appointment of racist federal judges in the South, his proposal of comprehensive civil 
rights legislation after two and a half years as President, and so on.1  In the 1960's and 
1970's, several books and articles focused critically on the work of the Kennedy 
Department of Justice relating to civil rights.2  According to those critiques, the 
Department’s voting rights enforcement was ineffectual, it refused to protect civil rights 
workers from official and private violence, and it was only reactive with respect to school 
desegregation.  Reevaluation of one aspect of the work of the Division during that period 
yields a more nuanced and largely positive picture and suggests that scholars should take 
a second look.3 
                                                          
1  See, e.g., Nick Bryant, The Bystander: John F. Kennedy and the Struggle for Black 
Equality (Basic Books 2006); Ted Sorensen, Counselor: A Life at the Edge of History 
(Harper 2008). 
2  See, e.g., Haywood Burns, The Federal Government and Civil Rights, in Southern 
Justice (Leon Friedman ed., Random House 1965); Victor S. Navasky, Kennedy Justice 
(Atheneum 1971); Richard Harris, Justice: The Crisis of Law, Order and Freedom in 
America (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1970). 
3  This period preceded my own work with the Civil Rights Division.  I was offered a job 
with the Division in the fall of 1963, but could not begin work until cleared by the FBI 
and funded by Congress.  I was in the air from Sacramento to Washington, D.C. on 
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I approach this topic as a lawyer, not as a historian or political scientist, who 
would view 
the work of the Justice Department solely through the lens of politics.  The political lens 
is important, but I believe that a complete understanding of the Kennedy Justice 
Department must also be based on the placement of the Civil Rights Division’s work in 
its legal and practical framework.  The Division exercises limited enforcement authority, 
defined primarily by statutes.  In January 1961, the Division was three years old, the 
newest and smallest Division in the Department of Justice.  The Department enforced the 
law through court actions.  The courts had not yet defined the scope of forbidden state 
discrimination, had found limits on coverage of private action, and tried criminal cases 
before virtually all-white juries who sympathized with the existing racial caste system.  
There was no federal police force, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation was more 
interested in bank robbers and Communists than in racial discrimination.  While 
nominally a part of the Department of Justice, in practice the FBI was the private fiefdom 
of J. Edgar Hoover. 
 
 In evaluating the performance of the Civil Rights Division, it is not enough to ask 
what the Division could have done in any individual instance.  Racial discrimination 
against African-Americans was the norm in the deep South, so it was inevitable that, 
given the Division’s limited staff,4 the Division failed to act in some instances.  One must 
evaluate those failures in the context of the overall performance of the Division.   
 
 Moreover, in assessing whether the Division should have stretched the law, taken 
extra-judicial actions, or imposed a heavier Federal law enforcement presence, one must 
bear in mind the precedential impact of government decision-making during the civil 
rights era.  We must ask whether we want a Department of Justice that stretches the law, 
takes extra-judicial actions, or imposes a heavy Federal law enforcement presence.   
 
 After first briefly sketching out the circumstances under which the Kennedy Civil 
Rights Division operated, I will begin to paint a picture of the work of the Division on a 
micro scale; I believe this approach will help fill in the picture painted by those who have 
written at a macro level.  This is a longer-term project.  For this paper, I have relied 
primarily upon reports of the Civil Rights Division on its voting rights cases, Annual 
Reports of the Attorney General, Civil Rights Commission reports, court opinions, and 
the files of one Division attorney who served during that period.  Together, these sources 
portray a small band of lawyers and support staff engaged in a Sisyphean effort to secure 
the right to vote, while at the same time devising ways to combat racial segregation of 
schools and interstate transportation.  The Division did this even though Congress failed 
to authorize a direct frontal attack on racial segregation.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
November 22, 1963, when the pilot informed us that President Kennedy had been shot.  I 
began work in January 1964, under President Johnson and Attorney General Robert F. 
Kennedy. 
4 See infra,  4-5. 
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 The turbulent years, 1961-63, saw so much civil rights activity, race-based 
discrimination and violence that it is difficult to single out any one issue as most 
important.  Michal Belknap has written about the Department’s record in response to 
violent intimidation of African-Americans in the South, in his article, The Vindication of 
Burke Marshall: The Southern Legal System and the Anti-Civil-Rights Violence of the 
1960s.5  I have written about the Civil Rights Division’s enforcement of Voting Rights, in 
Free at Last to Vote: The Alabama Origins of the Voting Rights Act.  My paper will not 
focus on those important areas, but will look at the Kennedy Justice Department’s record 
in combating school segregation — an area where the Department’s authority was much 
less clear.  Despite the lack of clear authority, the Kennedy Justice Department actively 
adopted innovative legal techniques to bring about school desegregation. 
 
I. Limits on Authority 
 
 The Department of Justice was created by Congress in 1870.  Its authority is 
defined by the legislature.  The Supreme Court can, in turn, expand or shrink the 
definition provided by the legislature.  For example, Congress in 1875 granted the 
Department of Justice authority to prosecute individuals who discriminatorily denied 
access to public accommodations based on race, but the Supreme Court declared that law 
unconstitutional in The Civil Rights Cases of 1883, effectively limiting the authority 
Congress had bestowed on the Department of Justice.  In 1957, Congress considered a 
civil rights bill that included Title III, which would have given the Department extensive 
authority to bring suits against those that violated constitutional rights.  Over the 
objection of then-Senator John F. Kennedy, Title III was stripped from the bill, which was 
subsequently enacted as the Civil Rights Act of 1957.  It was this law that created the 
Civil Rights Division.  When the Kennedy Administration took office, the Division’s 
statutory jurisdiction was limited to enforcing laws against racial discrimination in voting, 
criminal deprivations of civil rights, and slavery.  Burke Marshall, who became the 
Kennedy Administration’s Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights in May of 1961, 
observed in an interview for Eyes on the Prize: 
 
 [W]hen the Kennedy Administration started, the only... statutory authority it had 
through the Department of Justice was... in voting rights.  So that the first goal of 
the Department of Justice was to bring a whole lot of voting rights cases....6 
 
Marshall took the limitations on the Department of Justice’s authority seriously.  
He recognized the long term dangers if the Department were to take the law into its own 
hands, or to seek to act without the permission of Congress or the courts.  Marshall did 
                                                          
5  33 Emory L.J. 93 (1984). 
6  Eyes on the Prize Interview with Burke Marshall (Nov. 4, 1985), available at 
http://digital.wustl.edu. 
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not mention the criminal laws in his interview, presumably because it was virtually 
impossible to get a Southern all-white jury to convict a white person for a crime of 
violence against civil rights workers.  And, the Division generally did not bring cases to 
enforce Brown v. Board of Education’s ban on school segregation, because it had no 
statutory authority to bring such cases.  Burke Marshall’s top assistant, John Doar, 
explained: 
 
We didn’t have any jurisdiction to bring school cases at that time, and we only 
entered school cases as friends of the court, or if there was a violation of a federal 
court order.7 
 
Congress had, in short, not granted the Department authority to address the many 
facets      of the racial caste system in an effective way.  John Doar described the strategy: 
 
I was engaged with ... trying to see that the laws were enforced or building a 
record of why the existing laws weren’t effective.  And ... you do that by trying to 
make the existing laws as effective as you can.  And that’s what we did.8 
 
II. History and Makeup of the Civil Rights Division 
 
  As mentioned previously, the Division was formed in December 1957, as a result 
of Congress’ passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1957.  Initially, the nucleus of its lawyers 
was composed of lawyers from the Civil Rights Section of the Criminal Division.  Under 
President Eisenhower, the Department of Justice began its Honors Program, hiring the 
best qualified law school graduates instead of relying on the old system of cronyism and 
patronage.  The first Division career attorney hired under Attorney General Kennedy was 
a Republican, Arvid Sather.  In addition, the Attorney General kept John Doar, a political 
appointee toward the end of the Eisenhower administration, in the number two post in the 
Division.   
 
  Burke Marshall described the Division at the beginning of his tenure as Assistant 
Attorney General this way: 
 
Many of the lawyers in the civil rights division were young and had recently been 
recruited.  They were recruited because they had a commitment to the cause of 
racial justice, but they didn't know anything, in a way, they had no experience ... 
with the reaction that was going to take place to, against the movement for racial 
justice.  The Attorney General was new in his job....  I was out of a big law firm in 
Washington with a corporate practice....9 
                                                          
7  Eyes on the Prize Interview with John Doar (Nov. 15, 1985), available at 
http://digital.wustl.edu. 
8  Ibid. 
9  Marshall interview, supra note 6. 
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  The Division, which four years earlier began with a staff of fifteen lawyers, had 
barely over twenty on January 20, 1961, when President Kennedy was inaugurated.  The 
Division grew from this modest beginning, eventually reaching a size of about 40 
attorneys in August 1963.10   The Division had initially been composed primarily of 
“desk” lawyers, who reviewed files, made recommendations, but did not spend much 
time in the areas where the racial caste system was entrenched.  By the time the Kennedy 
administration took office, Assistant Attorney General Harold Tyler and his top assistant, 
John Doar, had already begun to change the way the Division operated.  Attorney General 
Kennedy embraced the new style: sending attorneys into the field in order to create 
relationships with local people, to begin understanding how the caste system operated, 
and to find the best cases to litigate.  This new style was, in part, necessitated by the 
limited usefulness of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, whose leader, J. Edgar Hoover, 
had a “mindset that was anti-civil rights movement” and who viewed the Bureau’s job 
with respect to civil rights investigations very narrowly.11  Division attorneys were 
expected to work very hard and to work long hours.  Thus, career attorney David L. 
Norman estimated that he worked an average of 25 hours of overtime per week.  The 
Annual Report for the year ending June 30, 1961 noted that the field work “has required a 
serious work load problem, as evidenced by the fact that twenty-five Division attorneys 
have spent an accumulated 904 days in the field during the past fiscal year.”12 
 
  The Division worked primarily through lawsuits in the federal courts.  Some 
southern U.S. District Court Judges, including some Kennedy appointees, were often 
hostile to civil rights, some regarded civil rights cases skeptically, and only a few were 
strong enforcers of civil rights.  Under the law, district judges’ findings of fact could be 
overturned by higher courts only if they were “clearly erroneous,” a very significant 
barrier to any fact-based appeal.  So the Division sought to present iron-clad cases; it 
treated every case as if it would lose in the district court and have to take an appeal under 
the exacting, clearly erroneous standard of review.  
 
  The Division had no police force available to enforce the law.  In cases of 
emergency, U.S. Marshals could be deployed, and in a few extreme cases the President 
was able to deploy the military and nationalize the national guard.  The Kennedy 
administration had a well-founded belief that a national police force, or a regional one 
confined to the South, posed great danger to liberty and the federal system and would not, 
in any event, be effective in stopping racial violence directed at civil rights workers.  
Indeed, killings of civil rights activists Viola Liuzzo and James Reeb in Selma, Alabama 
                                                          
10  Testimony of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Committee on the Judiciary, 
United States Senate, 242 (Aug. 1, 1963). 
11  Ibid. 
12  Annual Report of the Attorney General 1961, 167-68. 
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and the shooting of James Meredith during his march in Mississippi occurred during a 
period of heavy federal presence.  
 
  Despite its limited authority, the Civil Rights Division fought a multi-front war.  
Top priority was given to the right to vote, both because that was where the Division’s 
authority was greatest and also because it was viewed as a right that, once secured, would 
lead to other rights.  Although the Congress had rejected a proposal that would have 
given the Division broad authority to vindicate other constitutional rights, including the 
right to equal education, the Division treated school desegregation as a high priority.  It 
participated in several cases as a “litigating amicus curiae,” a status initially justified as 
related to enforcement of court orders.  It filed amicus curiae briefs with the Solicitor 
General in Supreme Court cases involving school desegregation and sit-ins.  It also 
sought to bring desegregation suits on behalf of children in military families in school 
districts in Mississippi, Alabama, Maryland, and Virginia.  It brought suits to desegregate 
interstate transportation facilities, such as bus stations and airports.  And, it worked on 
solutions to various violent crises, such as the Freedom Rides, bombings in Birmingham, 
interference with desegregation, and the sit-ins.  One can get a small picture of the range 
of the Division’s activities, and of what Richard Reeves calls the “density of event,”13 
from a chronology I have created, which primarily lists Civil Rights Division activity in 
court.  The chronology is attached to this paper. 
 
                  III. School Desegregation 
 
  The Deep South reacted to Brown v. Board of Education by adopting a posture of 
massive resistance.  When President Kennedy took office, no schools in Alabama, 
Georgia, Mississippi or South Carolina were desegregated, and only one African-
American student attended a desegregated school in Louisiana.14  Today, it is difficult to 
understand the depth and breadth of Southern white resistance to school desegregation.  
Efforts to enforce Brown faced multiple obstacles including repression of the primary 
initiator of desegregation cases, NAACP; state legislation; threats of violence; uncertainty 
as to what steps Brown required; and lack of resources.  One obvious solution was to 
enlist federal law enforcement.  In theory, refusal to desegregate violated a criminal 
statute forbidding official conduct that willfully deprived any person of constitutional 
rights.  However, that statute had normally been used to prosecute violent acts by 
government officials, and in any event, it was clear that no southern jury would convict 
an official for enforcing the state’s segregation laws.  The Eisenhower Justice Department 
was of the view that the ambiguities of Brown would make it difficult to bring criminal 
prosecutions against school officials who failed to desegregate.  Attorney General 
Brownell opined that “the discretion vested in the district courts” by Brown was a barrier 
                                                          
13  Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power, 19 (Simon & Schuster 1993). 
14  1961 United States Commission on Civil Rights Report, Vol. 2, Education, 238. 
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to prosecute under the federal criminal civil rights statute.15   Neither desegregation nor 
respect for the rule of law would be promoted by criminal prosecutions that were 
guaranteed to fail.  The more promising route was to bring civil suits seeking to enjoin 
school segregation.  These would not require a jury trial.  However, Congress had not 
authorized the Department of Justice to bring civil suits to desegregate the schools.   
 
  The Attorney General could have decided to bring desegregation suits despite the 
lack of congressional authority.  There was some precedent for the Justice Department’s 
non-statutory authority16.  However, in both the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
administrations, the Department took the position that without congressional 
authorization it could not bring a civil suit to enjoin violations of the Constitution.  There 
were policy, practical, legal, and political reasons for this position.  As a policy matter, 
such suits would be inconsistent with respect for the separation of powers as Congress 
had rejected Part III of the Civil Rights Act of 1957.  Practical considerations included the 
Civil Rights Division’s limited staff and its decision to emphasize suits against 
discrimination in voter registration.  Legally, the Congress’ decision to delete Part III 
from the Civil Rights Act of 1957 would likely have led courts to infer that Congress 
meant to limit the Department’s authority to what was explicitly granted.  The legislative 
history of the Act reflects that the deletion of Part III stemmed largely from a desire not to 
“approve the race-mixing decision of the Supreme Court of May 1954.”17  This point was 
underscored by the contrast between the powers granted to the Civil Rights Division [to 
bring voting discrimination cases] and those granted to the Civil Rights Commission [to 
investigate voting discrimination AND denials of equal protection of the laws].  
Politically, proceeding without congressional authority might alienate moderates on 
whom the Administration would have to rely to get its program through Congress and 
Congress was unlikely to increase staff size to enable a school desegregation initiative.  
 
  The Kennedy Justice Department’s approach to school desegregation has drawn 
criticism.  Victor Navasky described it this way: “Candidate Kennedy had promised 
innovative litigation to speed school desegregation, but President Kennedy ignored the 
counsel of men like Harvard’s Paul Freund and Mark De Wolfe Howe, Philip Elman of 
the Solicitor General’s office and William Taylor (eventually director of the Civil Rights 
Commission under LBJ), who advised, according to a confidential memo prepared by 
civil rights aide Harris Wofford, that the government could sue to desegregate schools 
                                                          
15  See Brian K. Landsberg, Enforcing Civil Rights: Race Discrimination and the 
Department of Justice, 138 (University Press of Kansas 1997). 
16   See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 562 (1895). 
17  Statement of Senator Richard Russell of Georgia and other materials reprinted in 
Brian K. Landsberg, Enforcing Civil Rights: Race Discrimination and the Department of 
Justice 12, 187 n. 43 (University Press of Kansas 1997). 
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with no new legislation.”18  The critics of the Kennedy Justice Department do not discuss 
the legal merits of this approach nor do they consider the consequences that might have 
ensued if the government were to bring school desegregation suits and the courts rejected 
the suits on the ground that the Attorney General lacked authority to bring them.  
 
  The decision not to assert a general power to enforce Brown did not, however, 
mean that the Kennedy Justice Department would ignore school desegregation.  Robert F. 
Kennedy gave his first speech as Attorney General at the University of Georgia Law 
School in May 1961.  The Attorney General showed great courage when, before an 
auditorium of Southern whites plus the two lone African-Americans attending the 
University of Georgia, Kennedy expressed personal agreement with the decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education.  He urged the people of the South to comply with Brown, 
whether they agreed with it or not.  He noted that he had already conferred with Southern 
officials on a variety of issues and was “trying to achieve amicable, voluntary solutions 
without going to court” in school desegregation cases.  However, if voluntary efforts 
failed, he said the Department would take legal action to enforce the laws.  Stressing the 
need for national unity, he issued a challenge:  “For on this generation of Americans falls 
the full burden of proving to the world that we really mean it when we say all men are 
created equal and are equal before the law.”19   
 
  The Attorney General’s speech made clear his commitment to school 
desegregation, both because it was right and because the law demanded it.  The question, 
according to one critic, is whether  “there was a clear dissonance between Kennedy’s 
words and his actions.”20  I think that is too simplistic a question.  It fails to place the 
words and actions in the context of the time.  It also fails to recognize that inspirational 
words may coexist with practicing the art of the possible.  Finally, it fails to take account 
of developments over time.  The critique challenges this course of action:  instead of 
trying to assert a general authority to bring school desegregation cases, the Justice 
Department followed a more cautious course of action.  The Department tried through 
negotiation with local school officials to bring about peaceful desegregation in some 
                                                          
18  Victor Navasky, Kennedy Justice 97-98 (Atheneum 1971); see also Nick Bryant, supra 
note 1, at 250-260 (alleging that Attorney General Kennedy “had no intention of 
hastening the pace of school integration,” and criticizing failure to intervene forcefully 
and the reliance on seeking “compliance without confrontation,” as he put it).  But see, 
J.W. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School 
Desegregation 253 (Harcourt, Brace and World 1961) (Peltason criticizes the solely 
reactive role of the Eisenhower administration and notes that the Kennedy Justice 
Department had “started to take a more active role in school desegregation cases.”). 
19  Speech of Robert F. Kennedy, University of Georgia Law School (May 6, 1961) 
available at http://www.rfkmemorial.org/lifevision/universityofgeorgialawschool/. 
 
20  Nick Bryant, supra note 1, at 260. 
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urban school districts.21  More important, the Civil Rights Division looked for other 
means of enforcement.  It followed a multi-prong approach: traditional amicus curiae 
participation in desegregation cases; enlarging the traditional amicus role; bringing suit or 
intervening in private suits in order to enforce existing federal court orders; bringing suit 
on behalf of children of federal employees in federally impacted school districts; and the 
use of emergency powers to combat interference with school desegregation orders.  Some 
of these techniques had already been used in the Eisenhower administration.  
 
A. Traditional Amicus Curiae Participation in Desegregation Cases 
 
The Rules that apply to the Supreme Court and U.S. courts of appeal allowed the 
United States to participate in cases in those courts as amicus curiae [friend of the court].  
The U.S. had done so in Brown v. Board of Education, first urging an end to the doctrine 
of separate but equal and later arguing that “the vindication of the constitutional rights 
involved should be as prompt as feasible.”22  Early in the Kennedy administration, the 
Department of Justice was invited to file a brief in a school desegregation case in New 
York.  It filed such a brief in the district court in May 1961 and another in the court of 
appeals during the summer of 1961.23  In January 1963, the Department filed a brief as 
amicus curiae in the only school desegregation case to reach the Supreme Court during 
the Kennedy Administration.  Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall argued the case 
in the Supreme Court in March.  The issue in that case was the validity of a desegregation 
plan, which allowed students whose race was in the minority in the school to which they 
were assigned to transfer to a school in which their race was in the majority.  The 
Department argued that the plan was unconstitutional, and the Court agreed.24  The 
Department also pointed out the snail’s pace of school desegregation in the South and 
argued that Brown required “the elimination of segregation as soon as possible,” and that 
the school boards had a heavy burden to justify any delays.  The brief argued: “A 
prerequisite of every acceptable plan of desegregation is that it move definitely and 
expeditiously away from the old regime of racial discrimination.”25 
 
B. Enlarging the Traditional Amicus Curiae Role 
 
                                                          
21  Nick Bryant, supra note 1, at 255. 
22  Brief of United States on Relief at 4, Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 
(1955). 
23  Taylor v. Bd. of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d. 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961), 
cert. denied 368 U.S. 940 (1961). 
24  Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963). 
25  Brief of United States, Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 1963 WL 105481 (U.S.). 
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  The Department also sought to enlarge the traditional role of an amicus curiae — 
to file legal briefs and present oral argument advising the court how to rule — as the 
Department sought to use the amicus curiae role to actually litigate cases by undertaking 
activities hitherto limited to the parties, such as examining witnesses and filing motions.  
The possibility of an enlarged role had emerged in 1957, during the Eisenhower 
Administration, in a case involving violent interference with desegregation in Clinton, 
Tennessee and then during the Little Rock school desegregation process, when the 
Governor of Arkansas had interfered with desegregation orders of the federal court.  In 
Clinton, the Department participated in examining witnesses in a criminal contempt 
hearing, and in Little Rock the Department moved for an order enjoining the Governor 
from further interference.26  In November 1960, the Department entered the New Orleans 
desegregation case to challenge a Louisiana interposition statute that interfered with a 
federal court order; it continued in that role under the Kennedy administration.27  Less 
than two months after President Kennedy’s inauguration the Department successfully 
applied for an order in two Louisiana cases, designating the United States as amicus 
curiae and allowing it to file a motion to have a Louisiana statute that would have allowed 
school districts to close the schools rather than desegregate them declared 
unconstitutional.28  In 1962, the Department became a litigating amicus curiae in James 
Meredith’s suit to desegregate the University of Mississippi, where it became embroiled 
in contempt proceedings against Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett.  In 1963, the 
Department became a litigating amicus in a suit to desegregate Macon County, 
Alabama.29 
 
                                                          
26  Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 834 (1957); U.S. 
v. Faubus, 2 Race Rel.L.Rep. 958 (1957). 
27  Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., Civ. No. 3630 (E.D. La.).  Louisiana’s interposition 
statute provided: “That the decisions of the Federal District Courts in the State of 
Louisiana, prohibiting the maintenance of separate schools for whites and negroes and 
ordering said schools to be racially integrated in the cases of Bush v. Orleans Parish 
School Board, Williams 935 et al. v. Jimmie H. Davis, Governor of the State of Louisiana 
et al., Hall et al. v. St. Helena Parish School Board, Davis et al. v. East Baton Rouge 
School Board, Allen et al. vs. State Board of Education, involving the Shreveport Trade 
School, and Angell vs. State Board of Education, involving five (5) other trade schools 
maintained and operated by the State of Louisiana, all based solely and entirely on the 
pronouncements of Brown vs. Topeka Board of Education, are null, void and of no effect 
as to the State of Louisiana, its subdivisions and School Boards and the duly elected or 
appointed officials, agents and employees thereof.” Act No. 2 of First Extraordinary 
Session (1960). 
 
28  Hall v. St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd., 287 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1961); Davis v. E. Baton 
Rouge School Board, 287 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1961). 
29  Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Ed., 221 F.Supp. 297 (M.D.Ala. 1963).  
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 C. Bringing Suit or Intervening in Private Suits in Order to Enforce Existing  
      Federal Court Orders  
 
  It was a short step from the role of litigating amicus to actual intervention in suits 
or even attempting to bring a suit on behalf of the United States.  The Eisenhower 
administration had attempted to bring a suit against Louisiana to declare its interposition 
law unconstitutional.  That case was not presented as a desegregation case but as a case to 
prevent state interference with court orders to local school boards to desegregate.30  The 
Department’s entry into the New Orleans case as amicus, however, rendered it 
unnecessary for the court to reach the question of whether the Attorney General could 
bring a separate suit.  The Kennedy administration’s first foray into being a party in a 
school desegregation case came in April 1961, when the Attorney General moved to 
intervene in the Prince Edward County, Virginia case, one of the cases the Supreme Court 
had decided in Brown v. Board of Education.  The school board in Prince Edward County 
had voted to close the public schools rather than comply with the Supreme Court’s 
mandate.  The Attorney General attempted to justify intervention in the case as necessary 
to prevent obstruction of court orders.  The trial court refused to allow the intervention 
because it had not found that the closure obstructed its orders and because Congress had 
refused to enact Part III of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, a refusal that effectively barred 
the government from bringing actions furthering desegregation.31  However, the Civil 
Rights Division became an amicus curiae in the case, and Assistant Attorney General 
Burke Marshall presented the government’s arguments in the court of appeals in January 
of 1963.  By the end of 1963, the Civil Rights Division successfully sued Governor 
George Wallace to enjoin his interference with desegregation in three school districts.32 
 
D.  Bringing Suit on Behalf of Children of Federal Employees in Federally 
Impacted     School Districts 
 
The Civil Rights Division singled out one set of school districts where it believed 
it could legitimately bring school desegregation cases; the 587 school districts in southern 
and border states that received federal funds for school construction because they enrolled 
children of personnel stationed or employed at military installations.  While “almost a 
score” of those districts had agreed to desegregate by 1963, most did not.  The Division 
filed a “pilot” case in September 1962 against Prince George County, Virginia, school 
system.  It won the case the following June, eleven days after President Kennedy 
proposed the Civil Rights Act of 1963.33  The court agreed that the contract the school 
                                                          
30  U.S. v. Louisiana, Civ. No. 10566 (E.D. La. 1960). 
31  Allen v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 28 F.R.D. 358 (1961).  Later the 
court held the closure unconstitutional, Allen v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward 
County, 207 F.Supp. 349, 355 (E.D. Va. 1962). 
32  U.S. v. Wallace, 222 F. Supp. 485 (M.D. Ala. 1963). 
33  U.S. v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince George County, 221 F. Supp. 93 (E.D. Va. 1963). 
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board had signed in order to receive over a million dollars of federal construction money 
obligated it to follow state law, and that the district had not followed Virginia’s pupil 
placement law when it assigned African-American military dependents to all-black 
schools.  The court emphasized that the ruling did not authorize the United States to sue 
to vindicate the personal rights of the children.  It treated the case solely as one to enforce 
a contract.  The Civil Rights Division brought similar cases against four school districts 
in Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi.  In May 1963, before the favorable decision in 
the Prince George County case, the courts in three of those cases ruled against the United 
States; the court in the fourth case, decided that August, declined to follow the ruling in 
Prince George County.34  The Kennedy Civil Rights Division appealed three of the cases.  
The Fifth Circuit affirmed in early 1964 and the Supreme Court refused to review that 
decision.35  The court disagreed that the school districts were under any contractual 
obligation to desegregate and also held that the United States had not shown that the 
segregation burdened the exercise of the war power of the United States.  Both rulings 
were based in part on the lack of any congressional authorization for suit asserting either 
theory.   
 
 
E.  Use of Emergency Powers to Combat Interference With School 
Desegregation      Orders  
 
The Justice Department played a major role when hostile reaction to 
desegregation orders led to crisis.  President Eisenhower had sent federal troops to 
enforce a federal court school desegregation order in 1957.  President Kennedy issued a 
Presidential proclamation deploying federal troops and marshals again in support of 
federal court orders desegregating the University of Mississippi in 1962 and another to 
support desegregation of the University of Alabama in 1963.  Also, in 1963, the President 
called the Alabama National Guard into national service to support orders to desegregate 
public schools in Mobile, Tuskegee and Birmingham.  Each of these moves was reactive.  
There was an interesting shift in the statement of grounds for each of the 1963 
Presidential proclamations.  The proclamation of June 11, 1963, regarding desegregation 
of the University of Alabama, refers to an unlawful combination of the Governor and 
others “against the authority of the United States” and concludes: “WHEREAS this 
unlawful combination opposes the execution of the laws of the United States and 
threatens to impede the course of justice under those laws [the President commands them 
to cease and desist].”  Three months later, however, the proclamation regarding the public 
school desegregation concluded by noting that the “unlawful ... combinations ... so hinder 
                                                          
34  U.S. v. Biloxi Municipal Sch. Dist., 219 F.Supp. 691 (S.D. Miss. 1963); U.S. v. 
Gulfport Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 219 F.Supp. 691 (S.D. Miss. 1963); U.S. v. Madison 
County Bd. of Educ., 219 F. Supp. 60 (N.D. Ala. 1963); U.S. v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 
220 F.Supp. 243 (W.D. La. 1963). 
35  U.S. v. Madison County Bd. of Ed., 326 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1964) cert. den. 379 U.S. 
929 (1964). 
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the execution of the laws ... of the United States within the State of Alabama, that a part 
or class of its people is deprived of rights ... named in the Constitution and secured by 
law....”36 The earlier proclamation reflected the position, evident in all the Kennedy 
administration’s actions in school desegregation cases up to June 1963, that the Justice 
Department was not entering or bringing cases to vindicate individual rights of African-
American children, but to enforce federal government interests, either in enforcement of 
federal court orders or of federal contracts.  Shortly after the June proclamation President 
Kennedy made his speech proposing the Civil Rights Act of 1963, which would authorize 
the Attorney General to bring suit or intervene in suit to ensure the orderly desegregation 
of the schools.  Under the Act, the Attorney General could bring such a suit upon receipt 
of a written complaint from a parent who was unable to initiate appropriate litigation.  
This proposal may have inspired the change in the later proclamation, to emphasize that 
Governor Wallace was depriving school children of individual rights. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
  Should the Kennedy Justice Department have taken bolder, more aggressive steps 
to end school segregation in the South? 
 
  Richard Reeves tells us that one of President Kennedy’s favorite lines from 
Shakespeare comes from Part I of Henry IV.  Glendower says, “I can call spirits from the 
vast deep,” and Hotspur replies: “Why so can I, or so can any man; But will they come 
when you do call them?”37  It would have been easy enough for the Department of Justice 
to file suit against all the segregated school systems in the South, or against a sampling of 
them.  The hard questions come after the lawsuit has been filed.  Does the law support the 
suit?  Do the facts?  What shall the remedy be?  More aggressive government litigation to 
desegregate the schools could succeed only if the Southern courts agreed that the Justice 
Department had authority to bring such cases.  
   
There was reason to believe that such suits would be symbolic but not effective.  
As the columnist Walter Lippman explained, excision of Part III from the 1957 Civil 
Rights Act meant, “that the right against school segregation was ‘not to be enforced by 
the executive power of the Federal Government.’”38  In retrospect, the Fifth Circuit’s 
ruling in the impact aid school desegregation cases confirms that assertion of such broad 
authority would have met with failure, at least in the lower courts.  Even the victory in 
Prince George County came in a judicial opinion making it clear that the government had 
no authority to sue on behalf of the rights of African-American children.  The role that the 
                                                          
36  Proclamations 3542 and 3554. 
37  Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power, 491 (Simon & Schuster 1993). 
38  Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the 
Struggle for Racial Equality, 325 (Oxford University Press 2004) (quoting Walter 
Lippman). 
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Department played instead, while more limited, was more firmly based in its law 
enforcement role and history.  The Department took forceful action, not only against 
obstruction and noncompliance with desegregation orders, but also in support of more 
desegregation.  Its brief in the Goss case was unequivocally in favor of speeding up the 
pace of desegregation.   
 
  One must view the desegregation issue in light of Congress’ refusal to get 
involved.  Critics of the Kennedy Administration would put it differently.  They fault 
President Kennedy for waiting over two years before proposing a comprehensive civil 
rights act that would empower the Department of Justice to bring school desegregation 
cases.  He could, of course, have proposed that legislation in 1961.  To paraphrase 
Hotspur, however, one must ask, would Congress have passed the law if Kennedy had 
proposed it?  Even in 1963, the President’s civil rights legislation proposal was a huge 
gamble.  By the time of his assassination, it was clear that Congress would not pass the 
bill that year. 
 
  I believe that the Civil Rights Division’s performance, within the resource39 and 
legal restraints, did advance school desegregation.  The first phase of desegregation 
consisted largely of getting at least token compliance.  Most initial desegregation 
occurred in the border states.  By 1958-59, 733 of the 2,839 biracial school districts in the 
17 southern states had desegregated to some extent.  In the last two years of the 
Eisenhower administration only 44 desegregated, 31 voluntarily and 13 under federal 
court order.  Four states’ school districts remained totally segregated.40  The pace of 
desegregation quickened during the Kennedy Administration, with over 400 more school 
districts desegregating.41  Only Mississippi remained entirely segregated, despite the 
election of Governor George Wallace in Alabama, whose campaign slogan was 
“segregation today, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever.”  Firm steps by the 
Department of Justice at the Universities of Mississippi and Alabama and in the three 
desegregating school districts in Alabama had ensured that states would no longer use 
force to exclude African-Americans from formerly white schools.  The Supreme Court, 
after eight years of relative silence, followed the Department’s recommendation in Goss, 
ruling against the minority to majority transfer policy and also indicating that the time for 
delay had ended.  The Department of Justice was involved in a growing number of cases.  
                                                          
39   Perhaps the Justice Department could have been overcome their resource limitations, 
though it is clear that without a large infusion of new lawyers it would have been 
impossible for the Civil Rights Division to simultaneously pursue the litigation to enforce 
the right to vote and also undertake a multi-state offensive against school segregation. 
Attorney General Kennedy said that if the Civil Rights Act of 1963 were enacted, he 
would ask for an additional 40 lawyers, doubling the size of the division.  Kennedy 
testimony, supra note 10, at 241-242. 
 
40  United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1961 Report, Education, 39. 
41  United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1963 Staff Report, Public Education, 162. 
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The President had urged adoption of a bill drafted by the Division that would enable the 
federal government to become the primary player in bringing about school desegregation, 
a bill that would become law seven months after President Kennedy’s death. 
 
  The path to complete desegregation [i.e., every school district under a lawful 
desegregation plan] took years to complete.  Although a bi-partisan version of President 
Kennedy’s Civil Rights bill was enacted in 1964, more than eight years passed before the 
South was fully desegregated.  The rocky road after 1964 contradicts the claims that if the 
Department of Justice had only asserted authority to bring desegregation cases sooner, the 
schools of the South would have come into quick compliance with Brown.   
 
  The Department of Justice is a law enforcement agency, not a free agent to roam 
at will among policies that seem attractive or even morally compelling.  Viewed in that 
light, the Kennedy Department of Justice set an appropriate standard for enforcement of 
civil rights, a standard that has largely prevailed ever since.     
 
 
 
 
       
